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ABSTRACT
We empirically decompose the S&P 500's dividend yield into (1) a rational forecast of long-run real
dividend growth, (2) the subjectively expected risk premium, and (3) residual mispricing attributed
to the market's forecast of dividend growth deviating from the rational forecast. Modigliani and
Cohn's (1979) hypothesis and the persistent use of the "Fed model" by Wall Street suggest that the
stock market incorrectly extrapolates past nominal growth rates without taking into account the
impact of time-varying inflation. Consistent with the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis, we find that the
level of inflation explains almost 80% of the time-series variation in stock-market mispricing.
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The inﬂuence of the macroeconomy on the stock market is a subject of enduring
importance and fascination to academics, investment professionals, and monetary
policymakers. Academics have devoted much of their eﬀort to models that link stock
prices to consumption through the ﬁrst-order conditions of individual investors. Most
investment professionals have adopted a radically diﬀerent perspective. The leading
practitioner model of equity valuation, the so-called “Fed model,” relates the yield on
stocks (as measured by the ratio of dividends or earnings to stock prices) to the yield
on nominal Treasury bonds. The idea is that stocks and bonds compete for space
in investors’ portfolios. If the yield on bonds rises, then the yield on stocks must
also rise to maintain the competitiveness of stocks. The model is often augmented to
include a measure of the relative risk premium on stocks versus bonds, for example,
the historical relative volatility of the returns on these two asset classes. Practitioners
argue that the bond yield plus a risk premium deﬁnes a “normal” yield on stocks, and
that the actual stock yield tends to revert to this normal yield. If the measured stock
yield exceeds the normal yield deﬁn e db yt h eF e dm o d e l ,t h e ns t o c k sa r ea t t r a c t i v e l y
priced; if the measured yield falls below the normal yield, then stocks are overpriced.
Historically, the major inﬂuence on nominal bond yields has been the rate of
inﬂation. Thus the Fed model implies that stock yields are highly correlated with
inﬂation. In the late 1990’s practitioners often argued that falling stock yields, and
rising stock prices, were justiﬁed by declining inﬂation.
As pointed out by Asness (2000, 2003), the Fed model has been quite successful
as an empirical description of stock prices. Most notably, the model describes the
rise in stock yields, along with inﬂation, during the 1970’s and early 1980’s, and the
decline in stock yields during the past 20 years. Of course, movements in stock
and bond prices are highly persistent, and so it is desirable to evaluate the empirical
performance of the Fed model over a longer period. In Table 1 we use a series of
regressions to illustrate the performance of the model in the period 1927-2002. Each
regression has a measure of the stock yield as the dependent variable, and proxies
for the risk premium and the nominal discount rate as the independent variables.
Our basic measure of the stock yield is the dividend-price ratio, but we also consider
the earnings-price ratio, smoothed by averaging earnings over ﬁve years. Our ﬁrst
proxy for the risk premium is a cross-sectional beta premium within the stock market,
calculated by Polk, Thompson, and Vuolteenaho (2003) as the rank-order correlation
of stock-level yield measures with the stock’s CAPM beta. When this correlation
1i sh i g h ,i ti m p l i e st h a tm a r k e tp a r t i c i p a n t se x p e c tah i g hr e w a r df o rb e a r i n gm a r k e t
risk since riskier (higher-beta) stocks are much cheaper than less risky stocks. Our
second risk premium proxy is the historical volatility of excess stock returns relative
to that of nominal bonds, a measure previously employed by, e.g., Asness (2003).
T om e a s u r et h en o m i n a ld i s c o u n tr a t ew eu s ee i t h e rt h ea v e r a g eh i s t o r i c a lr a t eo f
inﬂation, calculated as an exponentially declining moving average of past monthly
inﬂation rates, or the nominal yield on ten-year Treasury bonds.
The benchmark regression in the ﬁrst row of Table 1 explains 49% of the variation
in the dividend-price ratio using the cross-sectional risk premium and the histori-
cal inﬂation rate. Both variables are strongly statistically signiﬁcant. Beyond the
statistical signiﬁcance, the ﬁt of this regression is illustrated in Figure 1. Here the
triangles are the demeaned dividend-price ratio, the solid line is the contribution of
the cross-sectional risk premium to the ﬁt of the regression (the multivariate regres-
sion coeﬃcient times the risk premium), and the dashed line is the contribution of the
inﬂation rate to the ﬁt of the regression. The ﬁg u r es h o w st h a tm u c ho ft h ev o l a t i l e
movement of the dividend-price ratio during the 1930’s and 1940’s was related to
volatile movement of the cross-sectional risk premium. At the bottom of the Great
Depression, this explained the high level of the dividend-price ratio despite the pres-
ence of deﬂation, which our estimated model suggests should have supported stock
prices. As inﬂation rose during the late 1930’s and 1940’s, its negative inﬂuence on
stock prices was outweighted by the declining risk premium. In the postwar period
the cross-sectional risk premium generally trended downward, reaching a low point in
the early 1980’s. The inﬂation rate rose steadily during the 1960’s and 1970’s, and
accounts for the high dividend-price ratio (depressed stock prices) of the early 1980’s.
During the later 1980’s and 1990’s, the dividend-price ratio was driven downwards
both by a declining cross-sectional equity premium and by a declining inﬂation rate,
although the run-up in stock prices during the 1990’s was too extreme to be fully
explained by our two variables.
Alternative speciﬁcations are reported in subsequent rows of Table 1. Row two
uses the ﬁve-year smoothed earnings yield rather than the dividend yield; this change
reduces the R2 substantially, but has little eﬀect on the estimated coeﬃcients. A
regression that substitutes relative volatility for the cross-sectional risk premium (row
three) has a very similar ﬁt to the benchmark regression. Substituting the nominal
bond yield for historical inﬂation reduces the ﬁts o m e w h a ti ft h er i s km e a s u r ei s
the cross-sectional risk premium (row four), but not if the risk measure is relative
volatility (row ﬁve).
2Interpreting the Fed model
Despite the empirical success of the Fed model as a behavioral description of stock
prices, there is a serious diﬃculty with this model as a rational explanation of stock
prices (Modigliani and Cohn 1979, Ritter and Warr 2002, Asness 2000, 2003). To
understand the diﬃculty, consider the classic “Gordon growth model” (Williams 1938,
Gordon 1962) that expresses the dividend-price ratio in steady state as
Dt
Pt−1
= R − G, (1)
where R is the long-term discount rate and G is the long-term growth rate of divi-
dends. The Fed model argues that the discount rate on stocks is the yield on bonds
plus a proxy for the risk premium of stocks over bonds. These two variables will
explain the movement in stock prices if G is constant.
The problem with this interpretation is that the main inﬂuence on the long-term
nominal interest rate is the expected long-term rate of inﬂation (Fama 1975, 1990,
Mishkin 1990a, 1990b). The long-term real interest rate is comparatively stable
and does not move closely with the long-term nominal rate. While the Gordon
growth model can be written in nominal terms, this requires that dividend growth
G is measured in nominal terms. Since stocks are claims to the productive capital
of the real economy, one would expect that a change in long-term expected inﬂation
would move nominal G one-for-one, oﬀsetting the eﬀect on nominal R and leaving
the dividend-price ratio unaﬀected. In real terms, neither R nor G should change
with expected inﬂation. This criticism of the Fed model is forcefully expressed by
Asness (2003).
If the above conventional argument does not explain the empirical relation between
stock prices and inﬂation, what does explain this relation? One possibility is that
inﬂation (or the monetary authority’s response to inﬂation) damages the real economy,
and particularly the proﬁtability of the corporate sector. In this case real G might
fall when inﬂation rises, justiﬁably driving up the dividend-price ratio. A variant of
this idea reverses the causality, arguing that poor economic prospects induce ﬁscal
and monetary responses that ultimately increase inﬂation (Geske and Roll 1983).
The diﬃculty with this argument is that G is correctly interpreted as a long-term
real dividend growth, not the conditional expected growth at business-cycle horizons
such as three years. A second possibility is that inﬂation makes investors more risk
averse, driving up the equity premium and thus the real discount rate R.B r a n d t
and Wang (2003) present a model of this eﬀect.
3Modigliani and Cohn (1979) propose a more radical third hypothesis. They claim
that stock market investors (but not bond market investors) are subject to inﬂation
illusion. Stock market investors fail to understand the eﬀect of inﬂation on nom-
inal dividend growth rates and extrapolate historical nominal growth rates even in
periods of changing inﬂation. Thus when inﬂation rises, bond market participants
increase nominal interest rates which are used by stock market participants to dis-
count unchanged expectations of future nominal dividends. The dividend-price ratio
moves with the nominal bond yield because stock market investors irrationally fail
to adjust the nominal growth rate G to match the nominal discount rate R.F r o m
the perspective of a rational investor, this implies that stock prices are undervalued
when inﬂation is high, and may become overvalued when inﬂation falls. The div-
idend yield that emerges from the interaction of rational and irrational investors is
positively correlated with inﬂation and the long-term nominal interest rate. In recent
work, Ritter and Warr (2002) support this idea with a detailed empirical analysis of
the 1983-2000 bull market.
In this paper we try to distinguish among these three alternative views. To
understand our approach, it is helpful to return to the simple Gordon growth model
and subtract the riskless interest rate from both the discount rate and the growth
rate of dividends. We deﬁne the excess discount rate as Re ≡ R−Rf and the excess
dividend growth rate as Ge ≡ G− Rf. We are considering the possibility that some
investors are irrational, so we must distinguish between the subjective expectations
of irrational investors and the objective expectations of rational investors. As long
as the irrational investors simply use the present value formula with an erroneous
expected growth rate, both sets of expectations must obey the accounting identity of
t h eG o r d o ng r o w t hm o d e l . T h u sw eh a v e
D
P
= R
e,OBJ − G
e,OBJ = R
e,SUBJ − G
e,SUBJ (2)
= −G
e,OBJ + R
e,SUBJ +( G
e,OBJ − G
e,SUBJ).
In words, the dividend yield has three components: (1) the negative of objectively ex-
pected excess dividend growth, (2) the subjective risk premium, and (3) a mispricing
term that is due to a divergence between the objective (i.e, rational) and subjective
(i.e, irrational) growth forecast.
The ﬁrst step in our analysis is to show that Ge,OBJ = Re,OBJ − D/P tends to
rise, not fall, and that Re,SUBJ tends to fall, not rise, with inﬂation, thus ruling out
the rational justiﬁcations for the comovement of the dividend yield with inﬂation.
4The second step is to show that, consistent with the Modigliani-Cohn view, high
inﬂation coincides with a positive divergence between objective and subjective growth
expectations Ge, the wedge between the growth expectations of rational investors and
irrational investors who are subject to inﬂation illusion.
Empirical implementation and results
In our empirical implementation we use the loglinear dynamic valuation frame-
work of Campbell and Shiller (1988), since this framework, unlike the simple Gordon
model, allows for time-varying discount rates and dividend growth rates. The Gor-
don model (1) has the limitation that the expected returns and expected growth
must be constant, thus it is suitable for our purposes only as an illustration. The
Campbell-Shiller formula for the log dividend-price ratio can be written as
dt−1 − pt−1 ≈
k
ρ − 1
+
∞ X
j=0
ρ
jEt−1r
e
t+j −
∞ X
j=0
ρ
jEt−1∆d
e
t+j, (3)
where ∆d denotes log dividend growth, r denotes log stock return, ∆de denotes ∆d
less the log risk-free rate for the period, and re denotes r less the log risk-free rate for
the period. ρ and k are parameters of linearization deﬁned by ρ ≡ 1
±¡
1+exp(d − p)
¢
and k ≡−log(ρ) − (1 − ρ)log(1/ρ − 1).A t y p i c a l v a l u e f o r ρ is 0.97. When the
dividend-price ratio is constant, then ρ = P/(P +D), the ratio of the ex-dividend to
the cum-dividend stock price. Comparing Equations (2) and (3),
P∞
j=0 ρjEt−1re
t+j is
analogous to Re,OBJ and Re,SUBJ,a n d
P∞
j=0 ρjEt−1∆de
t+j is analogous to Ge,OBJ and
Ge,SUBJ, depending on whether the expectations taken in Equation (3) are objective
(i.e., rational) or subjective (i.e., irrational).
In our empirical work, we will estimate the term
P∞
j=0 ρjEOBJ
t−1 re
t+j under objective
expectations. The objective expected growth can then be inferred from Equation (3)
as k
ρ−1 +
P∞
j=0 ρjEOBJ
t−1 re
t+j −(dt−1 −pt−1). The subjective risk premium is estimated
as the ﬁtted value of a regression of
P∞
j=0 ρjEOBJ
t−1 re
t+j on a subjective risk-premium
proxy λt (for example, on the relative volatility of stocks vs. that of bonds):
∞ X
j=0
ρ
jE
OBJ
t−1 r
e
t+j = constant + γλt + εt (4)
Mispricing, or the diﬀerence between objective and subjective expected dividend
growth, is the residual εt of this regression. When stocks are subjectively perceived
5to be very risky, then the ﬁtted value γλt is high. In contrast, when stocks are un-
derpriced the residual εt is high. Selecting γ with a regression implies an assumption
that mispricing is independent of the subjective risk premium. This choice for γ is
in a sense conservative since it minimizes the variance of mispricing.
Following Campbell (1991) and Campbell and Ammer (1993), we combine the
valuation framework with a vector autoregression (VAR) that predicts stock returns.
The VAR includes the excess log return on S&P 500 index over the three-month Trea-
sury bill (re), the cross-sectional beta premium of Polk, Thompson, and Vuolteenaho
(2003, λ
SRC), the log dividend-price ratio (dy), and the exponentially smoothed mov-
ing average of inﬂation (π). The sample period for the dependent variables is 1927:6-
2002:12, and the sample thus consists of 303 quarterly data points. Table 2 shows
the estimated parameters of the VAR system. We use this VAR to infer objective
and subjective excess dividend growth and returns.
Table 3 shows the standard deviations and Figure 2 a time-series plot of the three
estimated components of the log dividend yield: −
P∞
j=0 ρjEOBJ
t−1 ∆de
t+j, γλ
SRC
t ,a n d
εt. Together the three series add up to log-dividend yield. According to Table 3,
mispricing is the most volatile component of the log dividend-price ratio, while the
subjective risk component is the least volatile. Table 3 also shows the functions that
map the four VAR state variables into the three components of the log dividend price
ratio. Dividends are expected to grow rapidly when the subjective risk premium
and/or inﬂation is high. Objectively expected excess returns on stocks are high
when the subjective risk premium, dividend yield, and/or inﬂation are high.
Below each number in Table 3 is a standard error, calculated from 10,000 bootstrap
simulations of the VAR in Table 2, and an estimate of bias, calculated from the same
set of simulations. These standard errors and bias estimates must of course be treated
with caution since they are conditional on the validity of the estimated VAR as a
description of the data generating process. However, they provide some evidence
that the volatility of mispricing, and the eﬀects of inﬂa t i o no ne x p e c t e dd i v i d e n d
growth and mispricing, are statistically signiﬁcant and are if anything understated by
our point estimates.
Perhaps surprisingly, our model detects stock prices signiﬁcantly overpriced in
the summer of 1933, although the dividend-price ratio is approximately at its sample
average. This detected overpricing can be explained by two simultaneous phenomena:
First, the expected long-run dividend growth was extremely low at 2.5 standard
deviations below its sample mean. Second, the subjective risk premium was 1.3
6standard deviations above its unconditional mean. Together, these two facts would
have predicted a high dividend yield and low stock prices, contrary to the about
average dividend yield observed at the time. Perhaps not surprisingly, another time
when stock prices are detected as overpriced is the end of 1999, a point in time many
consider the top of the technology bubble. Although at the end of 1999 the subjective
risk premium was 0.74 standard deviations below its unconditional mean, expected
dividend growth was close to its unconditional mean. The two variables together
justify a dividend-price ratio of 3.3% versus the observed 1.2%, leaving a gap of 2.1%
to be explained by mispricing. At the other end of the spectrum, our VAR detects
stock as overpriced in 1947 and 1983, years in which dividend yields weree more than
two and half times our fair yield estimates.
The central prediction of the Modigliani-Cohn (1979) hypothesis is that high in-
ﬂation leads to stock market underpricing and low (or negative) inﬂation leads to
overpricing. The main competing hypotheses are that low stock prices coinciding
with high inﬂation are rationally justiﬁed because high inﬂation coincides with low
expected dividend growth or a high subjective risk premium. To examine these hy-
potheses, we regress the three components of dividend yield on smoothed inﬂation in
Table 3. The regression coeﬃcient of −
P∞
j=0 ρjEOBJ
t−1 ∆de
t+j on inﬂation is -11.25 with
an R2 of 95%, implying a positive, not negative, relation between rationally expected
excess dividend growth and inﬂa t i o n . T ot h ee x t e n tt h a ti n ﬂation coincides with
poor economic conditions, the worst seems to be over and future growth looks bright
(perhaps because of the low initial level). The subjective risk premium seems largely
unrelated to inﬂation. Thus, we reject the rational hypotheses justifying the positive
association of dividend yield and inﬂation.
In contrast, our VAR results in Table 3 provide strong support to the Modigliani-
Cohn (1979) hypothesis. The regression coeﬃcient of εt on inﬂation is strongly
positive, and statistically and economically signiﬁcant. The strength of this relation
is illustrated in Figure 3 that plots mispricing, εt, and inﬂation scaled by its regression
coeﬃcient, against time. The 78% R2 is evident in the ﬁgure as the lines plot almost
perfectly on top of each other, as predicted by Modigliani and Cohn.
Table 4 examines the robustness of these results to minor variations in the VAR
speciﬁcation. The ﬁr s tr o wo ft h et a b l es h o wt h em a i nr e s u l t sf r o mT a b l e3a s
ab a s i sf o rc o m p a r i s o n . R o w st w oa n dt h r e ea l t e rt h ed a t af r e q u e n c yt om o n t h l y
and annual, with little changes in our main results. Row four uses the relative
volatility of stocks vs. bonds as the subjective risk measure, signiﬁcantly reducing
7the positive correlation between expected excess dividend growth and inﬂation but
actually increasing the R2 of inﬂa t i o no nm i s p r i c i n g . R o wﬁve substitutes ﬁve-year
smoothed earnings yield for dividend yield, row six adds the TERM yield spread (the
yield diﬀerence between long-term and short-term government bonds) to the VAR,
a n dr o ws e v e nd e ﬁnes excess returns and excess dividend growth rates relative to
long-term bond holding-period returns, again with little impact on our main results.
Adding three additional lags to our VAR speciﬁcation adds noise to the estimates; it
almost eliminates the positive correlation between dividend growth and inﬂation, but
reduces the R2 of inﬂation on mispricing only to 49%. Finally, row nine accounts
for the possibility that the conditional variance of returns may systematically move
with the VAR state variables and thus create a time-varying wedge between expected
simple and log returns, with no change in results.
Conclusion
This paper presents a three-way decomposition of the stock market dividend yield
into a term due to rationally expected long-run dividend growth, a term due to the
subjective risk premium on the market, and a residual term that we attribute to a
deviation of subjectively expected dividend growth from objectively expected growth.
We use a VAR system to construct empirical estimates of these three components.
We ﬁnd that high inﬂation is positively correlated with rationally expected long-run
real dividend growth; thus the negative eﬀect of inﬂation on stock prices cannot be
explained through this channel. We ﬁnd that inﬂation is almost uncorrelated with
the subjective risk premium. However, inﬂation is highly correlated with mispricing,
supporting the Modigliani-Cohn (1979) view that investors form subjective growth
forecasts by extrapolating past nominal growth rates without adjusting for changes
in inﬂation.
In interpreting this result, it is important to keep in mind that inﬂation, the
stock market dividend yield, and its estimated components are all highly persistent
processes. Thus we have relatively few independent observations even in a 75-year
history, and our results should be regarded as suggestive rather than decisive. In
future work it will be important to gather additional evidence by examining the
relation between inﬂation and stock returns in other countries. It may also be
helpful to use survey data to measure subjective inﬂation expectations. In addition,
we cannot rule out the possibility that some part of what we call mispricing is in fact
a second component of the subjective risk premium, one that is common to all stocks
and thus does not appear in our cross-sectional measure of risk.
8The Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis has interesting implications both for investors
and for monetary policymakers. Investors need to know whether stocks, as real
assets, provide a hedge against inﬂation. Fama and Schwert (1977) and others
have documented the negative eﬀect of inﬂation shocks on realized stock returns.
The Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis explains this as the result of mispricing driven by
inﬂation illusion, an eﬀect which should diminish over the longer run. Boudoukh and
Richardson (1993) examine this issue directly and ﬁnd that stocks are better inﬂation
hedges over ﬁve-year periods than over one-year periods.
There has been an active recent debate about whether monetary policy should be
used to combat stock market mispricing. The Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis suggests
that disinﬂation may itself generate mispricing by confusing stock market investors
w h oa r es u b j e c tt oi n ﬂation illusion. It also implies that a successful stabilization
of inﬂation will reduce the volatility of mispricing and thereby contribute to the
eﬃciency of the stock market.
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11Table 1: Explaining the stock yield with a subjective risk-premium measure and
nominal bond yield
The table shows the OLS regressions of stock yield (either dividend yield, DY,o r
smoothed earnings yield where earnings are averaged over the past ﬁve years, 5EY)
on a subjective risk premium measure (either the Spearman rank correlation between
ﬁrms’ valuation multiples and estimated CAPM beta, λ
SRC, or relative past volatility
of stocks relative to bonds, λ
RV) and on a nominal yield measure (either the ten-year
taxable Treasury bond yield, LTY , or smoothed past inﬂation, π). The t-statistics
are computed using Newey-West (1987) standard errors with 60 leads and lags. R2
is adjusted for the degrees of freedom. The regressions are estimated from the full
sample period 1927:5-2002:12, 908 monthly observations.
Stock Risk Nominal adj.
yield Const. measure bond yield R2
DYt = 0.0397 +0.0512 × λ
SRC
t +0.2146 × πt 49.2%
(15.2) (6.4) (3.1)
5EYt = 0.0647 +0.0684 × λ
SRC
t +0.2381 × πt 27.5%
(8.2) (3.4) (1.2)
DYt = 0.0165 +0.0029 × λ
RV
t +0.2156 × πt 49.2%
(3.4) (5.9) (2.6)
DYt = 0.0378 +0.0547 × λ
SRC
t +0.1528 × LTYt 37.2%
(4.0) (5.2) (1.5)
DYt = -0.0069 +0.0046 × λ
RV
t +0.3576 × LTYt 49.1%
(-1.0) (6.6) (5.6)
12Table 2: VAR parameter estimates
The table shows the OLS parameter estimates for a ﬁrst-order VAR model including
a constant, the log excess market return (re
M), the subjective risk-premium measure
(λ
SRC), log dividend-price ratio (dy), and smoothed inﬂation (π). Each set of three
rows corresponds to a diﬀerent dependent variable. The ﬁrst ﬁve columns report co-
eﬃcients on the ﬁve explanatory variables, and the last column shows R2.B o o t s t r a p
standard errors (in parentheses) are computed from 10,000 realizations simulated from
the estimated system. The table also reports the correlation matrix of the shocks
with shock standard deviations on the diagonal, labeled “corr/std.” Sample period
for the dependent variables is 1927:6-2002:12, 303 quarterly data points.
constant re
M,t λ
SRC
t dyt πt R2 %
re
M,t+1 0.0768 -0.0520 0.03770 . 0 1 9 00 . 1 5 5 61 . 9 4
(0.0902) (0.0592) (0.0480) (0.0266) (0.4208)
λ
SRC
t+1 0.2501 0.0069 0.8160 0.07653 -0.6469 86.70
(0.0612) (0.0434) (0.0342) (0.0180) (0.2796)
dyt+1 -0.1402 0.0587 0.0087 0.9609 0.3370 92.67
(0.0943) (0.0610) (0.0496) (0.0278) (0.4428)
πt+1 -0.0036 0.0007 0.0026 -0.0012 0.9966 97.59
(0.0039) (0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0011) (0.0196)
corr/std re
M,t+1 λ
SRC
t+1 dyt+1 πt+1
re
M,t+1 0.1084
(0.0091)
λ
SRC
t+1 0.0227 0.0779
(0.1143) (0.0069)
dyt+1 -0.9063 -0.0132 0.1109
(0.0239) (0.1082) (0.0082)
πt+1 0.1290 -0.1658 -0.0983 0.0047
(0.0986) (0.0836) (0.0991) (0.0003)
13Table 3: Regressions of dividend yield’s components on inﬂation
The table shows derived statistics implied by the VAR model of Table 2. We decom-
pose the demeaned log dividend yield, dyt, into three components: (1) The negative
of long-run expected dividend growth, −
P∞
i=1 E
OBJ
t ∆de
t+1,w h e r e∆de
t+1 is the de-
meaned dividend growth; (2) the subjective risk-premium component, γλ
SRC
t ;a n d
(3) the mispricing component. The subjective risk-premium and mispricing compo-
nents are deﬁned as the ﬁtted values and residuals of the regression
P∞
i=1 E
OBJ
t re
t+1 =
γλ
SRC
t + εt,w h e r ere
t+1 is the demeaned excess log return on S&P 500 and λ
SRC
t the
demeaned cross-sectional beta premium. The upper-left section of the table, labeled
“Stdev” shows the unconditional standard deviations of the three components. The
lower left section shows the linear functions that map the VAR state variables into the
three components of demeaned log dividend yield. The VAR state variables are the
log excess S&P 500 return (re
M), the cross-sectional beta premium measure (λ
SRC),
log dividend-price ratio (dy), and smoothed inﬂation (π). The right half of the table
shows the simple regression coeﬃcients of log dividend yield and its three components
on smoothed inﬂation (π) and the corresponding regression R2s. Standard errors (in
parentheses) and bias estimates [in brackets] are computed from 10,000 simulations
f r o mt h eV A Ro fT a b l e2 .
dyt = −
P
E∆de +γλ
SRC
t +εt Regressions on inﬂation
Stdev: 0.3446 0.1831 0.5689
(s.e) (0.3212) (0.2665) (0.2966)
[bias] [-0.0910] [0.0200] [-0.18880] Dependent Coeﬃcient
Function: −
P
E∆de +γλ
SRC
t +εt variable: on πt: R2%
re
M,t -0.0040 0 0.0040 dyt 4.01 7.19
(0.0455) (N/A) (0.0455) (6.02) (14.48)
[0.0050] [N/A] [-0.0050] [-2.34] [4.74]
λ
SRC
t -0.4120 0.8342 -0.4222 −
P
E∆de -11.25 94.78
(0.1799) (1.0399) (1.0367) (6.35) (33.46)
[0.0955] [-0.0431] [-0.0524] [4.24] [-36.01]
dyt 0.2506 0 0.7493 +γλ
SRC
t -1.58 6.61
(0.2320) (N/A) (0.2320) (3.85) (15.42)
[-0.0085] [N/A] [0.0085] [0.25] [9.65]
πt -13.0318 0 13.0318 +εt 16.83 77.90
(6.2212) (N/A) (6.2212) (6.78) (27.07)
[5.2482] [N/A] [-5.2482] [-6.84] [-35.33]
14Table 4: Alternative VAR speciﬁcations
The table examines the robustness of the implied regression statistics presented in
Table 3. In the base speciﬁcation, we ﬁrst decompose the demeaned log dividend
yield, dyt, into three components: (1) The negative of long-run expected dividend
growth, −
P∞
i=1 E
OBJ
t ∆de
t+1,w h e r e∆de
t+1 is the demeaned excess dividend growth;
(2) the subjective risk-premium component, γλt; and (3) the mispricing component.
The subjective risk-premium and mispricing components are deﬁned as the ﬁtted
values and residuals of the regression
P∞
i=1 E
OBJ
t re
t+1 = γλ
SRC
t +εt,w h e r ere
t+1 is the
demeaned excess log return on S&P 500 and λ
SRC
t the demeaned cross-sectional beta
premium. Then we compute the simple regression coeﬃcients of log dividend yield
a n di t st h r e ec o m p o n e n t so ns m o o t h e di n ﬂation (π) and the corresponding regression
R2s. Each row in the table corresponds to small change in the VAR speciﬁcation of
Tables 2 and 3.
VAR speciﬁcation: −
P
E∆de R2%+ γλt R2%+ εt R2%
1. Base case -11.25 94.78 -1.58 6.61 16.83 77.90
2. Monthly data -11.93 92.91 -1.40 7.15 17.10 80.07
3. Annual data -6.47 67.75 -3.16 10.45 12.87 64.26
4. λ
RV instead of λ
SRC -0.60 0.11 -4.17 2.75 10.15 82.08
5. 5ey instead of dy -8.18 95.19 -1.42 9.28 12.44 61.80
6. TERM added -10.37 90.69 -1.49 8.13 15.59 75.78
7. Stocks - bonds -14.65 96.49 -1.36 6.44 20.11 82.50
8. Four VAR lags -0.55 1.15 -3.13 10.12 7.38 48.63
9. Jensens’s inequality -11.31 95.22 -1.07 9.35 15.26 72.52
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Figure 1: Dividend yield, subjective risk premium, and inﬂation.
This ﬁgure plots the time-series of three variables: (1) Demeaned dividend
y i e l do nS & P5 0 0i n d e x ,m a r k e dw i t ht r i a n g l e s ;( 2 )d e m e a n e ds u b j e c t i v er i s k -
premium measure computed by Polk, Thompson, and Vuolteenaho (2003) as the
cross-sectional Spearman rank correlation between ﬁrms’ valuation levels and
estimated betas, marked with a solid line; and (3) the demeaned smoothed inﬂation
computed from the producer price index, marked with a dashed line. Subjective
risk premium and inﬂation are multiplied by their respective multiple regression
coeﬃcients in the regression of dividend yield on the subjective risk premium and
inﬂation. The sample period is 1927:5-2002:12.
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Figure 2: The three components of log dividend yield.
This ﬁgure plots the time-series of three variables that add up to demeaned
log dividend yield: (1) deviation of the long-run expected excess dividend growth
from it’s unconditional mean, marked with a dotted line; (2) demeaned subjective
risk-premium, marked with a solid line; and (3) the mispricing component, marked
with circles and a line. The subjective risk premium component and the mispricing
components are produced by regressing the discounted sum of future expected returns
on the subjective risk-premium proxy. The subjective risk-premium component is
the ﬁtted value of this regression, and the mispricing component is the error term of
this regression. The series are computed using the VAR of Table 2.
171927 1937 1947 1957 1967 1977 1987 1997
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
M
i
s
p
r
i
c
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
f
l
a
t
i
o
n
Year
Figure 3: Inﬂation and mispricing.
This ﬁgure plots the time-series of two variables: (1) The mispricing compo-
nent of log dividend yield, marked with circles; and (2) the ﬁtted value from a
regression of mispricing component on inﬂation, marked with a line. The mispricing
components is produced as the residual of the regression of discounted sum of future
expected returns on the subjective risk-premium proxy. The series are computed
using the VAR of Table 2.
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